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*- INTRODUCTION
The Adjutant General Corps (AGC) is a com bat. service
support branch with varied organizational structures,
diverse missions, and unique operational procedures in units
located around the world. Since the New Manning System
(NMS) is presently oriented to combat arms branches, it dees
not apply to the AGC. Because of the career development
policy that requires officers to be proficient in two
specialties and the narrow pyramidical officer grade struc-
ture at tattalion level, the NMS is likely to be more bene-
ficial to enlisted personnel. Therefore, the purpose of
this research is to determine whether the principles of the
New Manning System should and/or could be applied to the
enlisted personnel in the Adjutant General Corps.
The four basic features of the New Manning System are
stabilization, unit replacement, establishment of permanent
regiments, and establishment of regimental homebases.
Stabilization and unit replacement are combined to form the
unit replacement system known as Project COHORT (Cohesion,
Operational Readiness, and Training) . Stabilization means
that personnel will be stabilized in one unit, as a group,
for a definite period of time, part of which may be over-
seas. The Manning System Task Force [Ref. 1: p. 10] states
that unit replacement means overseas requirements will be
met by deploying the entire unit. The establishment of
permanent regiments and their homebases combine to forir the
U.S. Army regimental system. The Task Force [Ref. 1: p.
11] identifies a regiment as a non-tactical organization
that "consists of a grouping of like-type battalions .
that can te interchangeable and facilitate (sic) unit
replacement." Regiments will consist of between three and

seven battalions located both in the Continental United
States (CCNUS) and in places outside the Continental United
States (CCCNUS)
. Each regiment will have its headquarters
permanently located at an installation in CONUS, which will
be the regiment's hoirebase.
In addition to increasing cohesion and combat effective-
ness, stabilization and unit replacement will narrow the
professicnal circle for the soldier and allow bcth the
soldier and his or her family to build lasting friendships.
Homebasing will afford spouses an opportunity to develop a
career of their cwn ard give the soldiers and their families
a better idea cf where they would be stationed in the
future, as well as provide support systems for families.
Therefore, Legge and Andrews [Ref. 2: p. 207] believe that
the quality of life will be improved by strengthening the
social, religicus, educational, and recreational ties
between nilitary and civilian families in a hometown
setting.
A concern is that, since the New Manning System pres-
ently pertains to the combat arms only, the benefits of the
NMS will be limited to the combat arms soldiers. Failure to
provide support soldiers many of the same benefits may
result in dissension and degradation of morale and readiness
in support soldiers. let, because of the structure,
mission, and local procedures of AGC units, the New Manning
System, in its present configuration, cannot be applied to
the AGC. In order to increase cohesion and stability for
the AGC soldiers, the present assignment policy cf indi-
vidual replacement tc world-wide locations must be modified.
If the features of the New Manning System cannot be used,
then what policies should be developed in order tc provide
the AGC scldiers many of the same benefits which the combat
soldiers are receiving? This thesis addresses whether the
principles of the NMS should be applied to the enlisted
10

personnel in the AGC; if so, how; and whether applying these
principles meets the needs of the Army, the objectives of





Recogrizing that cohesion plays a vital part in any
army's ability to function effectively, the definition and
characteristics of cohesion warrant examination. This
chapter will be a concentrated look at cohesion's vital
parts and their impact on modern day forces.
A. HBAT IS COHESIOH?
According to Cartwright and Zander [Ref. 3: p. 91],
cohesion is "the degree to which the members of a grcup
desire tc remain in the grcup." From this definition, it
would appear that members of a highly cohesive group, when
compared with members of a grcup with low cohesion, are more
concerned with their membership, are more apt to contribute
to the group's welfare, and tend to be more active in group
events. Furthermore, Cartwright and Zander [Ref. 3: p. 91]
maintain that "cchesiveness contributes to a group's potency
and vitality; it increases the significance of membership
for those who belong to the group." Basically then, cohe-
sion involves a process which requires interaction between
individuals within a group, and results in the formation of
feelings which closely bond individual members to the group.
New that cohesion has been defined, what are some of its
characteristics? Ingraham and Manning [Ref. 4: p. 6] iden-
tify some as being mutual affection, interdependence, trust
and Icjalty to other group members. In more common military
terminology, Braun [ Bef . 5: p. 13] says, "Cohesion involves
group pride, group sclidarity, group loyalty, team spirit,
and teamwork." Based on its definition and characteristics,
it would seem that cohesion is the glue that binds unit
12

members together, transforming them into a more tightly kr.it
and formidable force than a similar unit lacking cohesion.
E. * BCW ECES COHESION WORK?
This is an important question and must be clarified if
the reader is to gain an understanding of cohesion. Braun
[Ref. 5: p. 22] indicates that two strong psychological
forces which contribute to the development of cohesion are
at wcrk en group members: individual motivation, and group
norms. Since individual motivation does not always conform
to group ncrms, stress may result, reducing the bond between
the individual and the group. Ideally, these individual
motivations and group norms are compatible, thereby reducing
any stress experienced by the individual and drawing him
closer to the group. It has been found that by the reduc-
tion of this stress level, a positive atmosphere is created
that is conducive tc the development of a strong cohesive
bond between the group and its members. Given the correct
climate, this new formation of cohesion tends to reinforce
group ncrms, further strengthening the group's psychological
hold over its members and perpetuates the development of
stronger unit cohesion.
Another factor that is extremely important to the estab-
lishment of cohesion is the participants' relationships to
their primary group. Some examples of these common primary
groups to which people might belong are the family, church
cr military unit. Primary groups are often homogeneous in
nature and are comprised of individuals that have shared
values and ideas, wcrk together on a daily basis, and lend
support to one another. Due to these strong psychological
forces involved, prinary groups have a strong and lasting
impact on their members' lives, and ties with these groups
are not easily severed. In part, this ability of the
13

primary group to bird its members together impacts or. the
degree of cohesion experienced by the group. In reference
to the German Army during WW II, Janowitz [Ref. 6: p. 182]
confirms this idea in the following statement:
In the army, when isolated from civilian primary groups,
the individual soldier comes to depend more and more on
his military primary group. His spontaneous loyalties
are to its immediate members whom he sees daily and with
whom he develops a high degree of intimacy.
Just what determines how much a person will be attracted
to a group? In general, it is thought that an individual
will be more attracted to a group the more favorable the
expected outcomes of nembership are to him. Cartwright and
Zander [Ref. 3: p. 96] propose four interacting sets of
variables that influence group participation:
1. Motive base for attraction, which consists of
cne's needs for affiliation, recognition, security, money
and other values that can be afforded by groups.
2. Incentive properties of the group, consisting of
i-s goals, programs, characteristics of its members, style
of operation, prestige, or other properties of significance
that impact on the individual's reasons for doing things.
2. Expectancy, the subject's perception that member-
ship will actually have beneficial or detrimental ccnse-
guences fcr him.
4. Comparison level, one's conception of how much
the group experience should provide in comparison to how
much it actually does. This means if the outcome is greater
than expected, the individual will be drawn closer to the
group.
Jancwitz's [Ref- 6: p. 183] study of the German
Wehrmacht during WW II revealed two sets of factors which
impacted en primary group solidarity and ultimately on unit




1. The Nazi nucleus of the primary group, the hard
core. Although a small percentage of the group, this hard
core acted as a central force that dictated group norms and
acted as a stabilizing force.
2. Composition of combat units were carefully moni-
tored to insure that a unit's members were of the same
ethnic and national crigin.
3. The Wehrmacht personnel replacement system was a
system that operated on the concept of unit replacement.
Instead cf replacing casualties on an individual basis, as
they cccur, units were allowed to deplete their strength,
and were then pulled out cf combat and refitted with
replacement troops and equipment. Through this method,
replacement troops were affcrded an opportunity to be assim-
ilated into their new unit prior to the unit's being
committed tc combat.
The cutcome of these actions had a positive influence
and resulted in an effective force that retained its cohe-
sive spirit well into the fading days of the war. This can
te substantiated by the relatively low desertion rate expe-
rienced by the German Army. Only at the very end of the
war\ when units were being hastily thrown together from
scattered resources, did unit cohesion start to drastically
decline.
The second set of factors discussed were those that
weaken primary group solidarity:
1. Isolation created stress and daily face-to-face
contact with one's primary group was identified as being
needed if unit cohesion was to remain strong. Soldiers
isolated frcm their units for several days, especially if
they were hungry and exposed to physical destruction, were
much more easily separable members of their group than ones
experiencing the same hardships, but in the presence of
their primary group members. Even during the Germans'
15

retreat in North Africa, Francs and ultimately Germany, unit
cohesion remained strong, and as long as the retreat was
well organized, the army remained a formidable force.
2. Family ties tended to weaken military primary
group bonds. As the war prcgressed, soldiers' ties to their
military primary groups were often challenged by the members
strong ties to the fairily. The Wehrmacht was aware of this
fact and did everything it could to alleviate the soldier's
concern for his family's safety. In an effort to quell
soldier's concerns, families were instructed to avcid
writing about any unpleasant conditions that existed in
Germany. While the overall desertion rate was low, many of
those that did occur happened while the soldier was at home
en leave with his family. This serves to point out the
strong ties the family primary group has on an individual.
3. Demand for physical survival tended to weaken
primary group cchesicn. It was found that the primary
group's tends of cohesion were disrupted only under the most
extreme conditions of direct threat to the individual.
While primary grcup cohesicn is a powerful force, its
mere presence does net mean that a unit will be an effective
force. Unless group norms, individual motivation and organ-
izational goals are congruent, strife will exist and the
unit's ability to effectively accomplish its missions will
he degraded. Little [Ref. 7: p. 195] verified this when he
said, "Studies of industrial crganization have noted that
cohesive primary grcups can at times supply the basis for
group opposition to the goals of management.
"
C. IHI IS COHESIOH IHPORTIHT?
Cohesion and its effects have long been recognized as
positive factors influencing military units. From his very
birth, a significant portion of man's existence centers
16

around various primary groups. These encounters are
extremely important, as they are a central part of the indi-
vidual's support system and provide a place of acceptance
and refuge. The degree of cohesion experienced within these
groups rests with the group's ability to fulfill its
memters' needs and draw them together into a tightly knit
unit. Ideally, as the cohesion within the group becomes
stronger, individuals' feelings which initially center
around themselves are surplanted by feelings about the
group.
Janowitz [Bef. 6: p. 181] explained that cohesion was
an important factor in German soldiers' lives and had a
direct impact on their ability to fight and withstand the
hardships cf war. The ordinary soldier did not fight
because cf political or ethical schemes, but rather because
he was a member of a cohesive primary group which satisfied
some cf his major primary needs. Furthermore, the German
soldier was likely fcc continue fighting, even in the face of
formidable odds, as long as he was well led and could give
and receive affection from the ether members of his squad or
platoon. Even during periods of retreat and wide-spread
losses, as leng as the German soldier was bound by the cohe-
siveness of his primary group's expectations and demands, he
was likely to be an effective fighting force. Marshall
[Ref- 8: p. 42] reemphasized the idea about cohesion and
the primary group when he said:
I held it to one cf the simplest truths of war that
thing which enables an infantry soldier to keep going
with his weapons is the near presence or the presumed
presence of a comrade.
While German units with high cohesion suffered very
little frcm desertiens, or individually contrived surren-
ders, those with low cohesion did not fair so well. Tcward
17

the end cf WW II, Geiman units that were hastily assembled
with a hodgepodge of soldiers experienced little cohesion
and an atcv€-average desertion rate. These replacements of
different nationalities and backgrounds physically worked
together in the same unit, but they failed to congeal into a
cohesive fighting force capable of conducting effective
combat operations. Marshall [Ref. 8: p. 42] expanded on
this idea when he said a replacements lack of integration
into the unit often resulted "in the man's total failure in
battle and his return to the rear as a mental case."
In Men Against Fire, Marshall implies that men in combat
who lack strong unit cohesion are in effect merely gun
bearers incapable of effective cffensive combat actions. He
also proposes that the battle strength of a company is
derived from the composition of the company's smallest cohe-
sive units. This suggests that cohesion must start at the
unit's lowest levels and through a vehicle like Likert's
[Ref. 9: p. 183] linking- pin theory, extend to the rest of
the unit and to higher organizations.
The current world situation dictates that the accumula-
tion of large amounts of money, equipment, and manpower no
longer constitutes an acceptable state of preparedness. In
today's complicated world, a multitude of factors figure
into the O.S. Army's ability to effectively conduct ccmfcat
and attain its ultimate purpose—victory. The Army has
recognized this and in 1981 initiated efforts to harness one
of these elusive combat multipliers known as cohesion.
Colonel Ardant du P icg [Ref. 10: p. 3] stressed the impor-
tance cf cohesion when he said:
Pour trave men who do not know each other will not dare
to attack a lion. Four less brave men, but knowing each
other well, sure cf their reliability and consequences
of mutual aid will attack resolutely. There is the
science cf the organization cf armies in a nutshell.
18

Cohesion is an important and sometimes overlooked quan-
tity which may well dictate whether a unit succeeds and
survives or faulters and perishes. Other things equal, a
unit that is highly cchesive has an increased capability to
retain its members ever cne that lacks cohesion. The
greater this bond of cohesion, the greater the unit's
ability to influence members' actions through their
conformity to unit ncrms and goals. Highly cohesive units
qive to their members as well as take. They do this by
being a scurce of security for their members. This rela-
tionship serves to reduce group members' stress and increase
their self-esteem.
According to Tuckman [Ref. 11: p. 396] groups go
through four stages of development:
1. Forming: the development of role structure and
interperscnsl dependencies.
2. Storming: competition for position, emotional
tension, group drive.
3. Norming: the development of group ncrms and
cohesicn; pressures toward conformity.
4. Performing: productive task activity.
From this concept it appears that units which are at
Tuckman 's performance stage of development are better
prepared to operate effectively and be more productive than
a unit struggling to develop. Recognizing this, it appears
evident that a group is most cohesive and productive once it
attains the performing stage cf group development. It is at
this stage that a unit can direct the bulk of its time and
energies into organization- directed tasks which focus on the




Cohesion is not something that will solve all of the
Army's problems and guarantee success in battle, but it
clearly is a powerful force that needs to be tapped.
Efforts ty unit personnel to establish an atmosphere condu-
cive tc the formatior of cohesion are essential--strong unit
cohesion just does net happen by itself. The benefits are
real, and a highly cchesive unit may experience an increase
in performance, jcb satisfaction, retention rates, and
overall readiness.
Faced with the possibility of a "come as you are war,"
the U.S. Army has been forced to make a critical evaluation
of itself. In future conflicts, there may not be sufficient
time for external threats tc create cohesion in our fighting
forces prior to their actual commitment. Therefore, units
must be a cohesive, combat-ready element, capable of
responding to any contingency on little or no notice.
The guestion then is hew to get units to Tuckman's
performance stage quickly, and once there, keep them there?
In 1981, at the request of the Chief of Staff, the Army
initiated efforts to remedy this situation and improve its
readiness posture through the development and implementation
cf a process known as the New Manning System. This system,




III. THE HEW MANNING SYSTEM: HOW IT WORKS
The Dost-Vietnam era has seen a series of new dimen-
sions fcr manning the Army. The draft went out; the
volunteer Army came in. The focus was on resources,
efficiencies and the ccsts of maintaining adequate
manpower in uniform. In this resource-driven environ-
ment, it was only natural that the Army would again
resort to a manning system which would distribute
soldiers efficiently in accordance with priorities.
This individual replacement system has, and will
continue, to serve the Army well; it is flexible and
efficient. It eases management and puts soldiers where
the Army needs their, quickly and fairly. However, it
does take its toll. The constant flow of personnel intc
and cut of units--especia lly combat arms units--makes it
very difficult to foster cohesion and group solidarity
in the small, coufcat arms units which are the cutting
edge of the Army. [Bef. 12: p. <* ] Commanders Notes
In 1561, then Chief of Staff of the Army, General Edward
C. Keyer, "decided that combat effectiveness could be
improved by adopting procedures to replace entire units,
rather than individuals" [Ref. 13: p. 1]. His feelings
that the individual replacement system had destroyed the
sense of cchesicn and training teamwork originated efforts
which resulted in the New Manning System [Ref. 14: p. 20].
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the NMS encompasses two subsys-
tems: the unit replacement system and the U.S. Army regi-
mental system. This chapter discusses each of these systems
in detail.
A. TBE UNIT REPIACEBENT SYSTEM
Stabilization of personnel in companies is crucial in
creating an atmosphere conducive to unit cohesion. Goldich
[Ref. 15: p. 13] states that under the NMS, enlisted
soldiers serve in the same ccmpany-size unit from the moment
they begin initial entry training (IET) through the end of a
3-year cycle. First-term enlistees are recruited fcr a
21

specific COHORT unit and undergo IET as a group. When the
group has completed its training, it proceeds to a unit
where the group is joined by a cadre to form a stabilized
unit that will train and deploy together to a location
outside cf the Continental United States (OCONUS) on a fixed
schedule. After three years, the life cycle of the company
ends and it is disestablished. Those personnel who chose
not to reenlist are discharged from the active Army.
Personnel who have a service obligation remaining are indi-
vidually reassigned elsewhere.
Seme units spend their entire life cycle in the
Continental United States (CONUS) , while others do not.
Korea-bound units spend 24 months in CONUS before deploying
en a 12-mcnth tour unaccompanied by dependents. Units bound
for Europe, Alaska, Panama, and Hawaii spend 18 menths in
CONUS and deploy to OCONUS for 18 months. Families may
accompany the soldiers to these areas, if family housing is
available. By regulation, accompanied soldiers must serve a
36-mcnth tour OCONUS- Therefore, according to the Manning
System Task Force [ Bef . 1: p. 21 ], when their unit is
disestablished at the end of 18 months OCONUS, accompanied
soldiers will be individually reassigned within their
current tteater.
Once a unit is formed, soldiers are stabilized in the
unit for a 3-year period. The personnel system is not
allowed to tap this unit in order to meet demands elsewhere,
nor are unit members allowed to volunteer for assignments
outside of the unit. Naturally, exceptions due to health,
family, cr disciplinary problems will be allowed. The Task
Force [Bef. 1: p. 2 1 ] believes that this "allows leaders to
attain optimum training and readiness standards while
fostering a greater sense of cohesion and belonging."
22

Goldich [Ref. 15: p. 15] states:
Stabilization and unit replacement are inextricablyintertwined, Stabilization of personnel units insures
that an environment more favorable toward unit cohesionis created; unit replacement is required to maintain
stabilization.
According to the Manning System Task Force [Ref. 1: p. 10],
"This Project COHORT' type stabilization reduces the turbu-
lence and cohesion problem for one assignment. But what
then?" Dc the soldier and his family move on to the next
assignment--to another unit at a different location--to
start over again?
B. TEE O.S. ARMY REGIMENTAL SYSTEM
The answer to the above question theoretically is "No."
The O.S. Army regimental system will extend the benefits of
unit affiliation beycnd the soldier's current tour. Between
three to seven battalions of the same branch and structural
configuration will be grouped together to form a regiment.
These battalions will be located both in CONDS and in
OCON0S. Each regiment will be homebased at a CONUS instal-
lation, where its CCNOS battalions will be stationed. The
Task Force [Ref. 1: p. 10] states that soldiers who are
assigned tc and affiliated with a regiment "will return to
the same group of battalions throughout their careers,
thereby reducing the scope and impersonality of assignment
alternatives." The Task Force [Ref. 1: p. 10] believes
that, ideally, the regiment "will become the soldier's
family, his home and will offer long term stability and
predictability." It also feels that the system will facili-
tate affiliation by promoting identification with a group of
units, foster cohesion by keeping soldiers together, and
enhance loyalty by narrowing the circle of professional
23

relationships [Ref. 1: p. 10]. Goldich [Ref. 15: p. 19]
says the regimental system "will attempt to generate
cohesion and esprit among career officers and NCOs in the
same manner that (the unit replacement system does) among
first-term soldiers during their initial enlistments."
According to Armv, magazine (Ref. 14: p. 23], "The home-
basing aspect of the system should appeal particularly to
career soldiers because it will enable them to put down
•roots 1—buy homes, establish friendships--in the local
communities where their regiment is based."
When serving with troop units, career officers and NCOs
will be assigned to a battalion within their regiment. When
serving in a non-troop assignment (ROTC, recruiting, resarve
adviser, etc.) they will retain their regimental affilia-
tion. The Army will attempt to assign career officers and
NCOs tc non-troop assignments in the general vicinity of
their regimental homebase.
Combat arms soldiers who are permanently affiliated with
a regiment are allowed to wear regimental accoutrements,
whether they are in a troop unit or in a non-troop assign-
ment. Ccmbat support and combat service support soldiers
assigned to combat units will not be affiliated with a regi-
ment, but will be allowed to wear regimental uniform insig-
nias and participate in regimental activities while they are
assigned to regimental units.
C. PERCEIVED PROBLEM AREAS
The New Manning System is by no means a panacea for
reducing turbulence and increasing esprit and cohesion. In
fact, several problem areas exist within the NMS. First, it
is presently for ccmbat arms soldiers only. The unit
replacement system cannot be applied to combat support and
combat service support units because of the differences in
24

lengths cf IET for the various specialties in each unit.
Furthermore, Goldich [Hef. 15: p. 65] states that support
units are much more likely to be organized to meet local
conditions, such as relying heavily on civilian personnel in
CONUS, or teing staffed exclusively with soldiers overseas.
This causes CONUS units to be structured differently from
OC0N0S units and, because the regimental system groups units
of the same structural configuration, prohibits the applica-
tion cf the regimental system to the majority of the support
units.
Second, the unit replacement system will continue to use
the individual replacement system at the completion cf a
unit's life cycle. This seems to offset the benefits of
keeping soldiers together for a specific period of time, as
soldiers will receive scattered assignments after their unit
is disestablished, thereby losing the cohesion that has beer,
developed.
Third, the regimental system is supposed to be oriented
towards the career officers and NCOs, offering them repeti-
tive assignments in regimental battalions. Yet, as the
soldier becomes more senior in rank, there are fewer and
fewer assignments at battalion level. In spite cf attempts
to give career soldiers non-troop assignments in the general
vicinity cf their regimental homebase, the soldiers probably
will not be close encugh to it or their professional circle
to receive many, if any, of the benefits of the system.
E. SUHBABY
In summation, there are many purposes of the New Manning
System. One purpose is to create a close and lasting rela-
tionship between the soldiers and their unit by giving the
soldiers and their families greater stability, closer ties
to both military and civilian communities, more
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predictability and consistency in their assignment pattern,
and a greater sense cf control over their lives. Another
purpose is to reduce turbulence and enhance esprit by
fostering a new sense of belonging by giving the soldier a
smaller community within -he Army which he can identify with
over a period of time. However, -he primary purpose of the
NMS is to create cohesion in combat units so that their
combat effectiveness is maximized. Therefore, the NMS is
presently for combat arms soldiers only, but, despite its
problems, lieutenant General Thurman [ Ref . 16: p. 1] has
directed it to be expanded to include combat support and
combat service support soldiers.
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IV. BBITISH REGIMENTAL SYSTEM
In Chapter 3, the New Manning System was described and
its ccapcnent parts *ere identified. In this chapter, the
authors digress from the N MS and examine similar features
within the Eritish regimental system. The intent is net to
evaluate that system, but to look at its various parts to
see how the regiment is integrated into an effective
fighting fcrce.
A. NEW SOLDIERS
Following recruitment, the new combat arms soldier
receives his basic ard advanced individual training at a
division depot, which is staffed by personnel from all of
the regiients found in the division. Zacchetti [Bef. 17:
p. 6] states that due to low density of many specialized
support personnel, they attend basic training at division
depots, and their advanced training is conducted at loca-
tions outside the depot, such as branch locations or
schools. From the very beginning new recruits wear the
uniform cf their particular regiment. This unit identifica-
tion is the first official step in the integration of the
new recruit into the regimental culture and initiates the
development of a cohesive bend between the new soldier and
his regiment. Although it can obviously extend beyond regi-
mental tour, caries, this system fosters the soldier's primary
loyalty to his regiment. Faith and Ross [Ref. 18: p. 11]
believe that this "lcyalty to the regiment" is established





Under the current concept, the British regimental system
is directed primarily at the combat arms soldiers. Since
the regiirent is not a tactical entity, its composition may
vary considerably, but it normally ranges from one to five
battalions. According to the Manning System Task Force
[Ref. 1: p. 11], nc hard and fast rules govern the system,
and, in the case of the artillery, the regiment consists of
the entire branch. Zacchetti [Ref. 17: p. 7] states that
reserve fcrces play an important part in the system, and
sister battalions may be found both as active duty and
reserve units, with the number of battalions in one regiment
being subject to the reeds cf the Array.
Even though regimental battalions are of the same
branch, they are often organized and equipped for different.
missions. For instance, one cf the regiment's infantry
battalions might be organized as an airmobile battalion
stationed in England, while another one of its infantry
battalions is a mechanized unit stationed in West Germany.
Ihe battalions may be assigned to the same brigade or divi-
sion, but typically they are not. Individual battalions are
normally found scattered throughout the Army wherever they
are required.
C. RCTATIOB
To prevent battalions from going "stale," they are
rotated approximately every three to four years. This rota-
tion often includes the reconfiguration from one mission to
another, e.g., airmobile to mechanized. Battalions rotating
to long-tcur overseas areas are normally warned two years in
advance. This warning period allows the involved units to
establish liaison, coordinate the exchange of equipment, and
learn the basic requirements cf their new job. According to
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Zacchetti [Ref. 17: p. 7], the newly arriving battalion has
had an opportunity tc prepare itself for its new role, and,
by skillful use of advance parties, is considered capable of
accepting tactical missions almost immediately after arrival
at its new duty station. Watson [Ref. 19: p. 56] believes
that even though there may be a diminished operational capa-
bility during the changeover, the cohesiveness and esprit
alive within the regiment tends to offset the lack of
mission experience.
D. DHIFCEHS
Tc fester identification and enhance cohesion among
their members, comtat arms regiments are identified by
distinctive badges, ir.signia, headgear and/or special items
cf apparel. Faith ard Ross (Ref. 18: p. 9] point out that
regimental ident if icaxion may involve only minor items of
uniform apparel or nay be very distinctive in nature, as
seen in the Scotish regiment's kilt. tfithin a regiment, all
cf its permanently assigned combat arms soLdiers wear the
regiment's distinctive accoutrements and/or uniform apparel.
This ability to identify with a specific regiment is a posi-
tive factor in the formation of a cohesive bond between
regimental members. Regimental personnel continue tc wear
regimental identification devices even when assigned to
duties outside the regiment.
Since combat support units do not operate under the
formal regimental system, their personnel are individually
rotated en a 3-year basis tc wherever their skills are
required. Even though their soldiers do not enjoy the same
benefits cf the relatively stable regimental assignment
process, combat support branches attempt to develop a sense
cf cohesion through the wear cf distinctive badges and head-
gear. Ccmbat support soldiers continue to wear these items
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regardless cf their unit of assignment. For example, a
combat support soldier might wear a black beret indicating
his branch, even though he is serving with an infantry regi-
ment whose members wear blue berets. The British think this
use of accoutrements and uniform apparel helps tc fester
cohesion and a sense of unity among their combat support
soldieis. Although given wide latitude in uniform wear,
Faith and Ross [ Hef . 18: p. 9] indicate that dress regula-
tions are net completely without guidance, and all changes
must te approved at the Department of the Army level.
E. REPLACEHEHTS
One cf the majcr differences between the regimental
units and those not under the system is the method of
personnel replacement. Under the regimental system, entire
units, normally battalions, are replaced at one time. This
unit replacement is the glue that allows the cc hesiveness,
generated frcm prolonged contact with unit members, to bind
the unit into an effective fighting force. Prior to unit
rotation, some members may elect to transfer out, while
ethers may be reclassified for various reasons, resulting in
seme fragmentation of the unit's soldiers. These losses are
normally small and fail to adversely impact on the battal-
ion's sense of cohesion and esprit.
Stanhope [ Ref . 20: p. 32] states that in contrast to
the regiment's unit replacement system, combat support units
use a "trickle posting" method, which equates to the
American individual replacement system. Cheaper to operate
and easier to manage, the "trickle posting" system fails to
provide the cohesion and esprit found in the regimental
system. Low density requirements and lack of career devel-
opment and promotion opportunities have been factors which





Faith and Ross [ Bef . 18: p. 24] say that regiments may
employ unit rotation during United war situations, provided
a home rotation base is maintained at an adequate level.
During periods of liiited war, the length of overseas tours
have usually been shortened to about one year. During
general war, when the majority of combat arms units are
committed overseas, the British practice has been to leave
units in place within a theatre of operation and to rein-
force them with individual replacements or sub-unit drafts.
E. PERSCBKEL HAHAGEMENT
According to Watson [Ref. 19: p. 53 ], career management
for the regiment's soldiers is handled by the battalion
commander, along with one or two central record offices
which cover a number of infantry divisions. The battalion
commander is assisted in this area by his company commanders
and the regimental sergeant major (E9) . The normal sequence
for a new enlisted soldier is to spend his first three years
in the sane platoon learning his job. Further training is
dictated by the unit's needs and job requirements.
Zaccketti [Ref. 17: p. 7] states that soldiers' promo-
tions through the grade of EU are determined by battalion-
level promotion boards consisting of unit commanders, the
sergeant major, and ether senior personnel. According to
Faith and Ross [Ref. 18: p. 31], promotions in the senior
ranks are conducted by regimental boards with more emphasis
being placed on merit and potential than straight seniority.
The value of this beard is the fact that some, if not all,
of the tcarc members know the candidate personally, which
acts as a guality control check en the selection process.
Generally, the more senior the noncommisioned officer
is, the less time he will spend with the regiment. External
requirements place a manpower drain on the regiment's
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assets, and senior people often spend one-third to cne-half
of their time outside the regiment performing these duties.
Even when performing external duties, members maintain
affiliation with the regiment through the wearing of regi-
mental accoutrements and/or apparel.
G. RETEITICH
Bunyan [Ref. 21: p. 90] says that heavy reliance is
placed on the motivation of unit pride, membership, and
esprit to attract and retain volunteers. The close knit,
paternalistic nature of the regiment encourages commanders
to take a close interest in their soldiers, thus supporting
retention goals. Faith and Ross [Ref. 18: p. 10] think the
regiment demands loyalty of its members and it reciprocates
ty "looking after its own." According to Watson [Bef. 19:
p. 54], the British think the key to good retention is job
satisfaction, and soldiers can be retained if they feel they
are doing a worthwhile job, are appreciated and are a part
cf a team.
This retention ccncept parallels Herzberg, Mausner and
Synderman's [Ref. 22: p. 113] theory about work motivation
which states that certain hygiene factors, such as pay, do
not directly motivate soldiers. However, these hygiene
factors are important since their dissatisfaction or satis-
faction ultimately affects the soldier's attitude and
undoubtedly influences his decision to reenlist or not. The
importance of a soldier's self-worth is extremely relevant,
and a unit's ability to make their people feel they are an
integral and essential part of the unit ultimately bonds the
soldier tc his unit and regiment. Van Creveld's [Ref. 23:
p. 163] comment about why men fight closely parallels the
reason why the British regimental system is successful in
retaining its personnel and meeting its retention goals. He
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said that a German soldier, as a rule, did not fight for
Nazi ideology. Instead, he fought because he felt himself a
part of a well-integrated and well-led team which depended
on him.
H. FAMILIES
Since families are an integral part of the regimental
personnel management system. Zacchetti [Ref. 17: p. 8]
says that tremendous effort is expended to insure that
dependents are given proper care. David [Ref. 24: p. 5]
states that in order to accomplish this task, each battalion
has a designated Families Officer, who is responsible for
providing assistance to family members during unit rotation.
According to Zacchetti [Ref. 17: p. 8], this commitment to
the family is shown ty the facx that a large percentage of
British families are housed in government-controlled
housing. This close relationship of the family to the regi-
ment fosters the idea that "the regiment cares" and is an
important factor in the production of the cohesiveness which
binds the regiment together.
I. SOHBfiBY
Since its inception in 1660, the regimental system has
teen a part of the the British way of life. New regimental
soldiers enter service, are trained by regimental cadre, and
often spend much of their entire military career within the
same regiment. Regimental loyalty is initiated in the very
beginning and is reinforced throughout the soldier's career,
often extending into retirement. The regiment cultivates
unit cohesion, esprit, and a sense of self-worth through its
use of unit replacement, uniform accoutrements, uniform
apparel, personnel management practices, and its treatment
of the member's family. Through skillful use of the system,
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the regiment has been able to recruit and retain the quan-
tity and quality of scldiers that it needs.
Because of mission requirements and che low density of
combat support scldiers in most units, they are not part of
the regimental system. Recognizing this as a problem and
wanting to create as much cohesion as possible, combat
support tranches have adopted the wear of distir.ctive
uniform insignia and berets. Regardless of unit of assign-
ment, ccmbat support soldiers maintain affiliation with
their branches through the wear of these devices. The
British recognize the system's limitations, but think that
it is a positive element that assists in providing seme
element cf cohesion tc their ccmbat support soldiers.
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• ilPIJIfiG THE NEW IMPING SYSTEM TO THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
QQ EPS AND WHY IN ITS PRESENT CONFIG OR AT ION IT WOH1T WCRK
The New Banning System, in spite of its problems, is
working quite well fcr the ccmbat arms, and this is encour-
aging. However, the New Manning System will not work whan
applied to the Adjutant General Corps (AGC) . This chapter
will discuss why the New Manning System, in its present
configuration, cannct be applied to the Adjutant General
Corps.
A. WBY TEE DNIT REPLACEMENT SYSTEM WON'T WORK
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the unit replacement system
consists cf stabilization and unit replacement. The reasons
why these features cannot be applied to the AGC will be
discussed helow in separate sections.
1 . Whv. Stabilization WonJ.t Work
In the unit replacement system, stabilization within
the unit tegins in initial entry training (IET) and
continues through the end of a unit's 3-year life cycle.
This works well in ccmbat arms branches because the course
lengths of IET are the same within each branch. For
example, all the specialties in the Infantry have identical
course lengths. Therefore, the soldiers attend one station
unit training (OSDT) where they are in the same unit at the
same installation fcr the duration of their IET. As
discussed in Chapter 3, the unit is then joined by a cadre
to form a stabilized unit for the remainder of its life
cycle. This allcws fcr cohesion to begin to be developed in
these units during the conduct of OSUT.
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Stabilization will not work in the Adjutant General
Corps for several reasons. First, AGC soldiers may attend
basic training (BT) at any installation that conducts it.
Therefore, not all personnel who are recruited in the same
time period will undergo BT at the same installation. Upon
completion of BT , scldiers must then attend advanced indi-
vidual training (AIT), which is usually conducted at a
different installation than their BT . Furthermore, not all
AGC AIT is conducted at one location. Depending upon the
soldier's specialty, he or she may attend AIT at one of four
different installa ticns. Finally, not all AIT course
lengths are the same, varying from seven weeks and three
days to 12 weeks in length. This does not include the
School of Music for bandsmen, which is six months in length.
Therefore, varying locations for basic training and advanced
individual training, coupled with different course lengths,
prevent the application of unit stabilization to the
Adjutant General Corps.
2 . Wh v. On it Replacement Won^t Work
Unit replacement means that overseas requirements
will be met by employing the entire unit. The major problem
involving moving an AGC unit is that of severance of service
to supported units. The AGC is a combat service support
branch. Its units provide personnel administration and
management support tc customer units. If an antire unit was
reassigned overseas, it would mean that service to custcmers
would step, and a backlog would be created in persennei
actions and maintenance of records. For example, if the 7th
AG Ccmpany was deployed to Germany, the 7th Infantry
Divisicn would be without AGC support until a replacement
unit for the 7th AG Ccmpany arrived. Because of travel and
leave time involved, it would not be unreasonable tc expect
approximately 45 days to pass before a supporting AG ccmpany
could begin to service customers in a new location.
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Bat once in that new location, the unit is still not
capable cf immediately providing full support to its
customers. Local regulations and procedures vary in
personnel management and administration, and some tine is
needed zc train the personnel in these new ways. Secondly,
the historical and institutional knowledge is lest
concerning ongoing personnel actions, and the logic and
reasoning for actions taken on particular cases would be
unknown.
Another problem associated with movement of units is
that the AGC lacks common Tables of Organization and
Eguipment (TCE) and Tables of Distribution and Allowances
(TDA) . For example, the number of personnel authorized in a
personnel service company varies from 20 to 232. In addi-
tion to this, missions differ between CONUS and overseas
units. In Europe, Military Personnel Office (MILPO) assets
have been removed from the AG company and combined with
corps and community assets to form Regional Personnel
Centers (BPC). This leaves the AG company with primarily an
administrative role. In CONUS and Korea, the AG company
performs the mission of a MILPO, but. it is often supple-
mented by corps and/cr garrison assets. These assets would
not be reassigned with the company in the event of unit
replacement.
Finally, the vast majority of AGC soldiers are
assigned outside of AGC units. According to the Director of
the AG School [Bef. 25], the AGC soldier is assigned to
every installation and unit in the Army. Administrative
Specialists (71L) and Personnel Management Specialists (75B)
are found in more than 2,000 TOE and TDA units. According
to the Manning System Task Force [Ref. 26], only 4 percent
of the AGC soldiers could be stabilized through AGC ur.it
replacement. This percentage increases to only 11.5 percent
if all TOE units use unit replacement.
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In summation, the severance of support and resultant
backlog, the lack of common structure and mission, and the
wide dispersal of soldiers prohibit the use of unit replace-
ment in the Adjutant General Corps.
E. WBT TEE EEGIHENT1L SYSTEM ION«T WORK
The establishment of permanent regiments and their hone-
bases combine to fori the regimental system. A regiment is
defined as a grouping of battalions of similar structural
configuration and function. To accomplish this grouping,
battalions in CONUS are linked, or paired, with another
battalion OCONUS. These battalions then form a regiment and
facilitate unit replacement . The first problem facing the
AGC in this process is that there are very few AG battal-
ions. There are five personnel and administration battal-
ions in the Army. The battalion headquarters are comparable
in organization and authorized strength, but the number of
personnel service conpanies (PSC) subordinate to the battal-
ions ranges from one to four. , As mentioned previously, the
authorized strength of a PSC varies from 20 to 232
personnel.
This lack of common structure is only one problem.
Another problem is the imbalance between the number of units
located in CCNUS as opposed to those located OCONUS. If it
were acceptable to link companies instead of battalions in
order to form a regiment, this imbalance would prevent it
from occurring. There are 28 postal detachments in the
Army, and all but two of them are located OCONDS.
Similarly, there are 12 PSCs OCONUS, while there are only
four in CCNUS. This imbalance prohibits unit replacement,
furthermore, forming regiments with all of their units
located CCOUUS would be useless, as soldiers would spend
much more time assigned to units outside of their regiments,
especially if their regiment is in Korea.
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Since the establishment of regiments is prohibited by
lack of common organization and structure and CONUS/OCONUS
imbalance, it would not make any sense to have a regimental
homebase. There is nothing that prevents the Army from
declaring an installation a regimental homebase, but there
is no need for one without a regiment.
C. SUHMABY
The New Manning System in its present configuration is
not suited for application to the Adjutant General Corps.
The inconsistencies in initial entry training lengths and
locations, the reguirsment to sever support and the
resultant backlog, the lack of common structure and mission,
the wide dispersal cf soldiers, and the unit imbalance
within the Adjutant General Corps prevent the application of
the New Manning Systeir. But all is not lost. The configu-
ration of the New Manning System can be modified in seme
aspects. The authors will address some modifications which
may te cf benefit tc the soldiers, the Adjutant General
Corps, and the United States Army in the next chapter.
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71. A CONCEPT THAT CAN WORK IN THE ADJUTANT GENERAL CORPS
Even though the combat arms version of the NMS cannot be
directly applied to the AGC , alternatives exist. In this
chapter, the authors present a concept which will integrate
many cf tie desirable features of the NMS into the AGC. The
basic purposes cf these changes are to create a climate
conducive to the development and/or increase of unit esprit
and cohesion, with the ultimate goal of increased combat
effectiveness.
A. REGIHENTAL ANALYSIS
This analysis is divided into two subsections. The
first subsection deals with the definition of a regiment.
The second subsection presents guidelines to be used in
regimental identification.
1 • Regiment Definition
Conceptually, a regiment could be defined in many
different ways. The authors offer the following
def initicns:
a. Entire branch regiment: An entire branch
would be designated as a regiment. This idea is readily
adaptable to branches which are numerically small, espe-
cially since strong branch affiliation and identification
currently exist. Examples of these regiments might be
Finance, Judge Advocate General, or Chemical. Further divi-
sion cf functions or groups within regiments would net exist
under this definition.
b. Functionally subdivided regiments: A branch
would be subdivided into functional groupings, e.g., the AGC
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would be subdivided into the administration, band, etc.,
with these functional groupings being designated as separate
regiments. This would consolidate soldiers with similar
skills and job experience, and allow them to be identified
as a separate entity, and would best apply to numerically
larger tranches such as the Transporation, Signal, and
Adjutant General Corps. An example of this is where a 753
(Personnel Administration Specialist) could identify and
form a stronger bond to a Personnel Regiment than to the AGC
as a whole. These functionally grouped regiments would
serve to establish professional association-type bonds
between members, narrow a soldier* s circle of professional
associates, and facilitate the development of cohesion.
These regiments would not be established to supplant the
mother branch, but rather to assist it in achieving mission
goals
.
c. Entire branch regiment with functionally
subdivided battalions: This definition calls for the estab-
lishment of a single branch regiment with further subdivi-
sion of its functional groupings into regimental battalions.
This divisicn would serve to strengthen soldier identifica-
tion tc tie branch while presenting a climate conducive to
the development of strong primary bonds between similarly
skilled soldiers serving together in a battalion. An
example of this would be the establishment of the entire AGC
as a regiment, with cne of its functional groupings, like
administration, being a battalion. It is envisioned that
administrative soldiers would identify more closely to their
own battalion than the regiment as a whole. However, even
with this subdivision of functional groupings, overall iden-
tification and affiliation to the regiment would be
strengthened.
d. Geographically subdivided regiments:
Eranches would be divided into geographical areas which
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would, in turn, b€ designated as regiments. This would
encourage soldiers located in the same geographic area, such
as the southeastern portion of the states, to identify with
one another as being part of the Southeastern AGC Regiment.
The authcrs think a minimum of 500 authorizations should
exist in a regiment or battalion for a subdivision to occur.
This definition would apply to the numerically larger
tranches. As before, the intent of this breakdown was not
to supplant the basic branch, but to assist it in mission
accomplishment and in the building of esprit and cohesion.
2« Regiment Guidelines
Now that four definitions of a regiment have been
presented, what basic guidelines are pertinent to the estab-
lishment cf an effective regiment? Currently, the Enlisted
Personnel Management System (EFMS) is designed to provide a
career progression path for an enlisted soldier from the
rank cf E1 through E9. Because of this, the authors think a
regiment should acccumodate this policy by allowing for a
soldier to be promoted to E9 without being forced to become
a member of another regiment or battalion. Initiatives
contrary to EPMS policy would be counterproductive and cast
doubts on the basic ideas underlying the establishment of
regiments.
Since many Military Occupational Specialties (MCS)
"cap out" at a rank less than E9 , a promotion may force a
soldier into a different MOS. For example, when an E7 03C
(Physical Activities Specialist) is promoted to E8, his MCS
is changed from 03C to 71L (Administrative Specialist).
This MOS change provides continued career progression oppor-
tunities to the rank cf E9. So what is the point to all of
this? Since many disruptive situations like this currently
exist, the authors think future changes should not add
confusing and disruptive policies. Therefore, the
U2

identification of a regiment should take into consideration
career progression requirements to minimize the forced
transfer of soldiers from one regiment or battalion to
another due to promotion.
The numerical size of a regiment should be taken
into consideration, as regiments should be small enough to
encourage close identification between members and the regi-
ment itself. On the other hand, regiments need to be large
enough to allow DA managers flexibility in making assign-
ments. In "his regard, subdivisions of groups within the
regiment ere a viable and worthwhile option.
Finally, regiments should be composed of soldiers
with similar or closely related skills, jobs and career
progression paths. This will narrow the soldier's profes-
sional circle, assist in the establishment of a feeling of
"oneness," and encourage the formation of esprit, morale,
and cohesion.
B. RF.GICHA1 ANALYSIS
As explained in Chapter 5, homebasing is not considered
practical for the AGC soldier. If homebasing is net prac-
tical, is there a feasible alternative? Regional basing of
AGC soldiers is attainable and appears to be an acceptable
alternative. In this system, soldiers would be assigned to
designated areas of the United States called regions. Once
assigned, every effcrt wculd be made to insure that a
soldier wculd serve his CONUS tours in this region. Even
during periods of special assignments, such as ROTC or
reserve advisor, attempts would be made to station a person
in his designated region.
While failing to provide as many benefits as homebasing,
regional tasing does have its advantages. Often soldiers
and their spouses hail from the same geographic part of the
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country, and repeated assignments into this area would
increase the opportunity for visits to parents and/cr rela-
tives. Additionally, regional basing would afford a person
an opportunity to spend a large portion of their career in
an area suitable to their lifestyle and background. For
instance, a person who likes the cold, snow, and skiing
might opt for a region that includes the northeast part of
the ccuntry. This would serve to fulfill the soldiers
desires while satisfying the Army's needs.
Regions would serve as a restricting device by perma-
nently assigning AGC personnel to a designated portion of
the ccuntry. Regardless of any other benefits, the fact
that a scldier knows he or she will be located in a rela-
tively restricted region helps to reduce the constant
psychological stress of "Where in the entire United States
will I go next?" Regional basing has the potential for
providing many positive benefits.
Since the idea of regionalizaticn appears to be a valid
and positive concept, factors must be established to facili-
tate in the determination of regions. Considerations to be
determined in the breakdown of regions are as follows:
1. Regions must be small enough to allow soldiers
to identify with then:. Due to mission requirements and the
subsequent distribution of personnel, some states have few,
if any, AGC authorizations. Although not desired, this may
require that some regions be quite large geographically.
2. For assignment reasons, regions must be large
enough to insure a sufficient number of authorizations exist
within the same MOS . While there is no "magic number," the
authors think a minimum figure of 15 percent of CONCS
authorizations is reguired in each region in order for DA to
reasonably guarantee repetitive assignments to a region,
subject tc the needs cf the Army.
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3. The grade structure of the authorizations should
allow for career progression within each region. Due to the
limited size of some MOSs, the authors think that a minimum
of 100 authorizations, which closely approximate the
percentage of the CON0S rank distribution, should be present-
in a regicn.
4. The physical location of installations within a
state must be considered. For example, because Kansas
installations are located close to the Kansas and Missouri
torder, Kansas and Missouri should be placed the same
region.
5. To assist in effective management of assets, the
geographical breakdown of regions for all MOSs shculd be
identical.
C. SOMMABY
In this chapter, definitions of regiments and battalions
were discussed, and guidelines concerning the formation of
them presented. The concept of regional basing was proposed
and explained. While providing less stability than home-
rasing, regional basing has many positive and worthwhile
features which would serve to foster esprit and cohesion
within the AGC. Specific recommendations concerning the
adoption and implementation of these ideas will be presented
in the following chapter.
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VII. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this thesis was to address whether the
principles of the NMS should be applied to the enlisted
personnel in the AGC; if so, how; and whether applying these
principles meets the needs of the Army, the objectives of
the NMS, and the needs and desires of the AGC soldiers. In
Chapter 5, the authors discussed why the NMS, in its present
configuration, could not effectively be applied to the AGC.
In Chapter 6, alternatives to regimental units and regi-
mental hcmetasing were presented. This chapter will address
specific recommendations on ways to apply these alternatives
to the Adjutant General Corps.
a. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REGIMENT AND BATTALION
IDENTIFICATION
Based en the discussion presented in Chapter 6, the
authors propose the entire branch of the AGC be identified
as a regiment—the Adjutant General Corps Regiment. Since
it is a large corps and comprised of many functional group-
ings, the regiment should be further subdivided into 10
battalions. Battalion identification will conform as
closely as possible to the regimental guidelines mentioned
in Chapter 6. The 10 battalions are as follows:
1. The Administration Battalion, consisting of
soldiers with MOSs 71L (Administrative Specialist), 71C
(Stenographer), and 03C (Physical Activities Specialist).
Because 03Cs are reguired by career progression to beccme
71Ls at the E8 level, they were included in this battalion,
fihile forced to make an MOS change, the soldier will at
least remain in the same battalion.
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2. The Data Processing Equipment Operations
Battalion, consisting of soldiers with the MOSs 74D
(Computer/Machine Operator)
, 74F (Programmer/Analyst) , and
7UZ (Data Processing NCO).
3. The Personnel Eattalion, consisting of soldiers
with the MOSs 75B (Personnel Administration Specialist) , 75C
(Personnel Kanagement Specialist), 75D (Personnel Records
Specialist), 75E (Personnel Actions Specialist), 75F
(Personnel Informatics Systems Management Specialist) , and
75Z (Personnel Senior Sergeant).
4. The Recruitment and Reenlistment Battalion,
comprised of soldiers with the MOS 00R (Recruiter/Retention
NCO)
.
5. The Club Management Battalion, consisting of 00J
(Club Manager) personnel.
6. The Egual Opportunity Battalion, which is
comprised of 000 (Equal Opportunity NCO) personnel.
7. The Band Battalion, comprised of all the
soldiers in the Career Management Field (CMF) 97 (Bandsman).
8. The Legal Battalion, consisting of the MOSs 71D
(Legal Clerk) and 71E (Court Reporter).
9. The Chapel Activities Battalion, comprised of
71M (Chapel Activities Specialist) personnel.
10. The Journalism Battalion, which is comprised of
MOSs 71Q (Journalist) and 71R (Broadcast Journalist). The
Journalism Eattalion presents a unique situation requiring
explanation. Although under the proponency of the Signal
Corps (SC)
,
personnel in these MOSs wear AGC branch
insignia. These journalism personnel follow a career
progression path that, upon promotion to E8, requires them
to be reclassified into the MOS 84Z (Public Affairs/Audio
Visual Chief), a Signal MOS. This change would net be
nearly so drastic had it transpired earlier in the soldiers
career. New, after being associated for much of his career
U7

with members of the Journalism Battalion, the soldier is
forced to switch to a Signal MOS and a new regiment.
further compounding the problem is the fact that all 8UZ
personnel do not wear the same branch insignia. Seme
personnel wear AGC brass; others, SC brass. This situation
is not very conducive to the development of an atmosphere in
which cohesion and esprit can flourish.
Establishment of the above battalions would accomplish
several things. It would further define a member's primary
group, allcw for a mere personal identification with simi-
larly skilled individuals, and encourage members' affilia-
tion to their battalion. Another benefit would be the
integration of the tattalions to the regiment through the
linking process afforded by the chain of command, as
explained in Chapter 2.
Adoption of the proposed 10 battalions is not totally
void of concerns . First, all of the enlisted soldiers that
work with the Judge Advocate General and Chaplain Corps are
managed ty the AGC, while the officers are managed by their
respective branches. So where does a soldier's primary
allegiance belong; with the legal Battalion, or with the
soldier's primary work cell which includes officers from
another branch or regiment? It is questionable that this
dual regiment arrangement would provide the required climate
conducive to the development of the desired degree of cohe-
sion and branch affiliation. An additional concern is that
of the Journalism personnel, which was addressed above.
As in most situations, every desirable feature cf a
proposal cannot always be implemented. This is the case in
the Club Management, Equal Opportunity, and Recruitment and
Eeenlistment Battalions. Since all authorized postions in
these tattalions are in the rank of E5 and up, all of their
soldiers must be recruited from other MOSs. On a one-time
basis, these soldiers would be required to change
U8

battalions, and possibly regiments, but once into the new
MOS and regiment, could remain there through promcticn to
E9.
E. RECOMMENDATIONS FOB REGIONAL IDENTIFICATION
Because of the size cf the Adjutant General Corps
Regiment and some of its battalions, the authors felt that
cohesion and a narrowing of the professional circle would be
enhanced by further dividing five of the battalions into
regions. Using the guidelines discussed in Chapter 6, it is
recommend that the Continental United States be divided into
the following regions:
1. West: which includes the 10 states of Montana,
Wyoming, Colorado, Arizona, Utah, Idaho, Washington, Oregon,
Nevada and California.
2. South Central: which includes the 5 states of
New Mexico, Oklahoma, Arkansas, Louisiana and Texas.
2. North Central: which includes the 14 states of
North and South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Minnesota, Iowa,
Missouri, Wisconsin, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan,
Tennessee and Ohio.
4. Northeast: which includes the 13 states of
Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
Vermont, Virginia, and West Virginia, and the District of
Columbia.
5. Southeast: which includes the 6 states of
North and South Carolina, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia and
Florida.
This regional breakdown consists of areas which are
guite large, yet, to insure that a soldier could be repeti-
tively assigned to a region, this was a necessity. The map
















these areas are so large, the benefits of homebasing will
not always be available to the AGC soldier. However,
consistent with the needs of the Army, every effort should
be made to insure that a soldier is repetitively reassigned
to his regicn, and tc a desired installation when possible.
Repetitive reassignments to a region will not be artificial.
They will be made in crder tc meet the requirements of the
Army first and the desires of the soldier second.
Dividing all of the battalions into regions would cause
artificial assignments, prevent the guarantee of repetitive
reassignments, and prevent the Army from meeting its needs.
Because cf this, numerically small battalions were not
divided into regions. The authors felt that if a battalion
had less than 500 CCNDS authorizations, or if one of its
regions had less than 100 authorizations, it qualified as a
numerically small battalion and should not be divided into
regions. Therefore, it is recommended that the fcllcwing
battalions be divided into regions:
1. The Recruitment and Reenlistment Battalion.
The Administration Battalion.
The Legal Battalion.
The Chapel Activities Battalion.
The Personnel Battalion.
A detailed analysis of the regional breakdowns of all
battalions is located at Appendix A.
C. RECCHH2HDATI0NS FCR BAND ROTATION
One cf the four areas of the NMS deals with unit
replacement. As discussed in Chapter 5, the AGC s mission,
unit configurations and gecgraphic dispersion do not lend
the AGC tc the effective use of unit replacement. However,
there are seme situations where this concept can be selec-
tively employed. According to the School of Music, there
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are thr€€ major Army command bands operating under one TCE,
16 division bands under another TOE, and 26 other bards
operating under another TOE or TDA. Due to the nature of
their mission, structural similarities, and geographic
dispersion, the unit rotation of bands is generally consid-
ered feasible. In fact, the authors think the band may well
be the best unit in the Army for unit rotation, as they live
together, work together, have a common interest (music) .
Only four bands--the U.S. Army Field Band, located at Fort
Meade, MD; the Army Eand and the Old Guard Band, located at
Fort Meyer, Virginia; and the Academy Band at West Point,
NY--are considered outside of the acceptable parameters of
unit replacement and should not be considered in any rota-
tion system.
Therefore, the authors prcpose that the concept of unit
replacement (or rotation) be applied to the bands. It is
further recommended that the proponent for the bands develop
the specifics for band rotation, to include homebasing, and
that it be implemented at the earliest possible date.
D. RECCHMEHDATIONS FOB FURTHER STUDY
Based on discussicn in this thesis, or on the lack of
expertise and data available to the authors, it is recom-
mended that several areas be the subjects of further study.
1. Determine the feasibility of assigning the Legal
Eattalicn (MGS 7 1D and 71E) to the Judge Advocate General
Corps fcr proponency. Since the enlisted personnel perform
their duties in a work cell with officers from another
branch and reginent, it is doubtful that these enlisted
personnel will develop a cohesive attitude towards others in
the AGC Regiment. This study should include what branch
insignia or other accoutrements will be worn.
52

2. Determine the feasibility of assigning the
Chapel Activities Battalion (MOS 71M) to the Chaplain Corps
for propcnency. The same arguments apply to this situation
as in the Legal Eattalion above. Chapel Activities
Specialists work with Chaplains, not with other AGC
personnel. This study should also include the determination
of which hranch insignia and uniform accoutrements will be
worn
.
3. Determine the feasibility of having Journalism
personnel wear Signal Corps branch insignia. Since these
personnel are under the prcpcnency of the Signal Corps, a
study should be made to determine which branch insignia
should be wcrn. Cohesion cculd be improved if all personnel
in MCS 84Z wear the same branch insignia. Presently,
personnel in the Journalism Battalion wear AGC brass and are
managed by the Signal Corps, so it is difficult to tell
which branch they belcng to.
4. Develop the specifics for band rotation as
discussed in the previous section of this chapter.
5. Determine the feasibility of the establishment
cf regimental messes and museums and the wear of distinctive
uniform apparel and accoutrements. Due ~o the limited
expertise and resources of the authors, these topics were
not addressed in this thesis. However, they are an impor-
tant aid to creating an atmosphere conducive to the increase
of cohesion and esprit and should be studied immediately.
E. CCHCIDSIOH
The authors know that implementation of these recommen-
dations will not be an easy accomplishment, and that these
recommendations will not provide the AGC soldiers all of the
benefits which are provided to the combat arms soldier by
the New Manning System. However, some benefits can be
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realized by these proposed actions, and f therefore, imple-
mentation is warranted.
Establishing the entire branch as a regimen* will
continue to draw upon the presence of branch pride and
traditions. Establishing regimental messes and museums and
the wear of distinctive uniform apparel and accoutrements
may give the AGC soldier the same benefits that they give
the combat arms soldier and should be studied seriously.
Establishing battalions and regions will narrow the
professional circle cf soldiers, giving them a greater sense
of belonging and increase cohesion among peers. Battalions
would still be linked to the regiment, much like a platoon
is linked to a company.
Reassigning the legal and Chapel Activities Battalions
and changing the insignia of the Journalism Battalion is
crucial towards creating an atmosphere conducive to the
development of cohesion in these personnel. In the present
configuration of the AGC, these personnel are basically
"adopted" and have no similarities with other MOSs in the
Corps.
Implementing band rotation should provide even more
benefits than unit replacement does, since it is envisioned
that bands would not be disestablished at the end cf three
years like the COHORT unit.
There is only one reason to implement these recommenda-
tions: to increase the esprit, cohesion, and combat effec-
tiveness of the soldiers. If this cannot be accomplished,
then inplementation is senseless. The authors believe that
implementing these recommendations will accomplish this and,





REGIONAI BREAKDOWNS OP BATTALIONS
This appendix presents data, obtained from information
provided ty the Personnel Structure and Composition System
(PERSACS) data base, which was used to determine which
battalions should be subdivided into regions.
Authorizations with an effective date of 1 January 1987 were
selected to coincide with ongoing Department of the Army
projects. A caveat concerning the authorizations: a posi-
tion authorized at one station, with an assignment for duty
at a second station, is shown as an authorization at the
first station. Exanple: A 00R is authorized at Port
Sheridan, II, with a duty station at Topeka, KS. Therefore,
the data shews an authorization for Fort Sheridan, not for
Tcpeka.
This appendix contains a battalion analysis, tables, and
maps detailing the authorizations and geographic breakdown
of each tattalicn ir the Adjutant General Corps Regiment.
The battalion analysis presents a summary of the data
portrayed by the regional breakdown and highlights areas of
concern. Also included is a recommendation on whether or
not the battalions should be divided into regions. Separate
tables exist for each battalion and are further divided into
the following parts:
a. CONas Authorizations. This shows the number of
authorizations by grade in each region, the total authoriza-
tions in each region, the CONDS authorizations by grade, and
the total authorizations.
b. Percentage of CONDS Authorizations Per Region.
This shows the percentage of the total CONDS authorizations
that is in each region and is broken down by grade. For
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example, this part of Table I shows that 22.9 percent of the
E7 00J authorizations in CONUS are located in the West
Region.
c. Percentage of Authorizations by Grade within
Each Eegicn. This shews what percentage of a region's to-al
authorizations are in a specific grade. For example, this
part of Table I shows that 59.5 percent of the 00J authori-
zations in the West Begion are in the grade of E7.
d. Eegicn Authorizations. This shows the number of
authorizations by crade in each state (and Washington,
D.C.), the total authorizations in each state, the region's
authorizatiens by grade, and the region's total authoriza-
tions.
Kaps identify the regions, zheir percentage cf CONUS
authorizatiens, and the states having less than 1 percent of
the total CCNUS authorizations for each specialty. (These
states were considered to have a negligible impact on the





1. This battalion consists of soldiers with MOS 00J (Club
Manager) .
2. Total CONUS authorizations range from a low of 11.7
percent (Scuth Central) to a high of 35.1 percent
(Northeast) . Based en these percentages, fcur of the five
regions meet the 15 percent guideline.
3. The tattalicn fails tc meet the guideline of at least
500 CONUS authorizations, having only 239. Furthermore, all
regions have less than 100 authorizations, with the South
Central Eegicn having only 28. Due to the numerically small
amount of authorizations, the regional distributions are
heavily skewed, with the Northeast Region having three times
the authorizations as the Scuth Central.
u. Further compounding the problem is the fact that the
distribution by grade is also highly disproportional, with
nearly 70 percent of the E8 authorizations being in enly two
regions (Northeast and Southeast) . This would prevent
career progression within the other regions.
5. Eased on these data, recommend that this battalion not





REGION |3 E4 E5 E6 12 E8 11 TOTAL
WEST 12 25 2 3 42
SOUTH CESTRAL 7 13 6 2 28
SOUTHEAST 12 15 11 2 40
NORTHEAST 2 34 32 14 2 84
NORTH CENTRAL a 22 24 3 1 45
CONUS TOTAL 2 82 109 36 10 239
PERCENTAGE OF CONUS AUTHORIZATIONS PER REGION






E6 E7 E8 E9 TOTAL
14.6 22.9 5.6 30.0 17.6
8.5 11.9 16.7 20.0 11.7
14.6 13.8 30.6 20.0 16.7
41.5 29.4 38.9 20.0 3 5. 1
20.7 22.0 8.3 10.0 18.8
PERCENTAGE OF AUT HCBIZ ATI CNS EY GRADE WITHIN EACH REGION







E6 E7 E8 E9
28.6 59.5 4.8 7.1
25.0 46.4 21.4 7. 1
30.0 37.5 27.5 5.0
40.5 38. 1 16.7 2.4
37.8 53.3 6.7 2.2











E6 E7 E8 15 TOTAL
1 5 1 7
6 5 1 1 13




12 25 2 3 U2
SOUTH CENTRAL REGION AUTHORIZATIONS
STATE E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8
ARKANSAS 1





TOTAL 7 13 6
SOUTHEAST REGION AUTHORIZATIONS














E6 12 E8 E9 TOTAL
3 5 1 9


















E3 E4 E5 26 12 E8 E9 TOTAL





9 14 3 28
_2 _3 12 2 17
34 32 14 2 8U
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RECRUITMENT AND REEHLISTMENT BATTALION
1. This battalion consists of MOS 00R (Recruiter/Retention
NCO) personnel.
2. Total CONOS authorizations range from 10.3 percent
(South Central) to 37.3 percent (North Central). Two of the
five regions do not meet the guideline of having 15 percent
of the CCNUS authorizations. The North Central Region has a
high nuiiber of authorizations due to the presence of the
D.S. Army Recruiting Command at Fort Sheridan, IL, with U05
authorizations.
3. The Southeast and South Central Regions, both with less
than 15 percent of the CON US authorizations may cause prob-
lems with career progression from grade E6 to E7.
U. As mentioned previously, recruiters frequently are
authorized at one location, but are assigned for duty at
another location. Because of this, it is unknown exactly
where all actual duty stations are located.
5. In spite of these possible problems, it is reccmmended
this battalion, priuarily because of its large size, be
subdivided into the regions indicated.
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Recruitment and Reenlistment Battalion
CCNUS AOTHCRIZATIONS
REGION 12 E4 E5 26 11 E8 E9 TOTAL
NEST 2 189 366 98 12 667
SOOTH CENTRAL 146 214 75 12 44 7
SOUTHEAST 227 270 91 15 603
NORTHEAST 3 256 574 139 23 995
NORTH CEKTHAL 3
_384 _998 209 20 J.6J4
CONUS TOTAL 8 1202 2422 612 82 4326







E5 E6 E7 E8 12 TOTAL
25.0 15.7 15.1 16.0 14.6 15.4
12. 1 8.8 12.3 14.6 10.3
18.9 11. 1 14.9 18.3 13.9
37.5 21.3 23.7 22.7 28.0 23.0
37.5 31.9 41.2 34.2 24.4 37.3








J5 E6 E7 E8 E9
0.3 28.3 54.9 14.7 1.8
32.7 47.9 16.8 2.7
37.6 44.8 15.1 2.5
0.3 25.7 57.7 14.0 2.3
0.2 23.8 61.8 12.9 1 .2












E6 E7 E8 E9 TOTAL
17 27 11 2 57
92 200 46 6 346
26 42 11 1 80
16 23 7 1 47
9 3a 11 1 55
-22 _i£ 12 __J 82
189 366 98 12 667
SOOTH CENT5AL REGION AUTHORIZATIONS







Si 12 I8. 12 TOTAL
19 28 9 1 57
15 25 7 1 48
18 20 8 1 47
19 33 15 2 69
_Z5 19-8 36 _7 226
146 214 75 12 44 7
SOUTHEAST REGION AUTHORIZATIONS








26 11 E8 E9 TOTAL
23 37 10 1 71
44 64 16 2 126
37 50 16 5 108
14 34 9 1 58
79 53 32 4 168
_19_ _11 _8 _2 72
















5 £§ E2 E8 E9 TOTAL
12 29 9 1 51
45 75 19 2 141
20 61 12 1 94
18 21 7 1 47
18 42 8 2 70
2 53 141 30 3 229
1 56 149 30 3 239
28 38 18 8 92
2 2 1 1 6
^ 4 _I£ __5 _1 26
3 256 574 139 23 995















5 E§ E7 S8 E9 TOTAL
25 382 67 3 477
26 75 12 2 115
11 33 8 1 53
4 2 1 7
2 62 51 18 2 135
1 60 83 19 2 165
12 59 10 1 82
46 97 17 3 163
22 40 13 1 76
63 100 24 3 190


























































1. This battalion is comprised of MOS 00U (Equal
Opportunity NCO) personnel.
2. Total CONDS authorizations range from 15.1 percent
(West) tc 26.3 percent (Southeast). All of the regions
exceed the 15 percent guideline.
3. Ihe battalion fails to meet the guidelines of a least
500 CCNUS authorizations, having only 285. Additionally,
all regions have less than 100 authorizations.
4. Although evenly distributed in total authorizations,
some grace distributions may cause problems in career
progression. The West (E7, E8, and E9) , Sourh Central (E6) ,
and North Central (E9) have potential bottlenecks which
would require transfer tc another region in order to prog-
ress up the hierarchical ladder.
5. 3ased on the above data, it is recommended this





BEGION 11 EU J5 E6 E7 E8 E9 I2IAL
WEST 7 17 17 2 43
SOOTH CENTRAL a 12 23 5 1 45
SOUTHEAST a 23 40 7 1 75
NORTHEAST 5 24 33 3 2 67
NORTH CENTRAL _a 11 _29 _5 mm _55
CONDS TOTAL 24 93 142 22 4 285







25 I£ SI E8 E9 TOTAL
29.2 18.3 12.0 9.1 15. 1
16.7 12.9 16.2 22.7 25.0 15.8
16.7 24.7 28.2 31.8 25.0 26.3
20.8 25.8 23.2 13.6 50.0 23.5
16.7 18.3 20.4 22.7 19.3
PERCENTAGE OF AUTHOBIZ ATI CNS BY GRADE WITHIN EACH BEGION







6.3 39.5 39.5 4.7
8.9 26.7 51.1 1 1. 1 2.2
5.3 30.7 53.3 9.3 1 .3
7.5 35.8 49.3 4.5 3.0
7.3 30.9 52.7 9.1











E5 E6 E7 E8 E9 TOTAL
1 4 3 8






_4 _4 1 11
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_8 14 4 1 11
4 12 23 5 1 45
SOUTHEAST REGION AUTHORIZATIONS







E6 12 E8 E9 TOTAL
1 3 4
8 2 10
7 8 2 1 18
12 19 3 38
_3
_2 ^ _ _5



















10 12 3 2 32
_2 _3 ^ —m _5
24 33 3 2 67
NORTH CENTRAL REGION AUTHORIZATIONS
STATE E3 EU E5 E6 E7 E8 E9 TOTAL
ILLINOIS 5 1 6
INDIANA 3 3 6




1 _U _5 1
a 17 29 5
KENTUCKY 25
MICHIGAN 1










































1. This battalion consists of personnel with MCSs 71L
(Administrative Specialist) , 71C (Stenographer) , and 03C
(Physical Activities Specialist).
2. Total CONUS authorizations range from a low of 14.8
percent (North Central) to a high of 28.0 percent
(Northeast). Based en these total percentage, four of the
five regions met the guidelines of 15 percent of CONUS
authorizations in each region. Only the North Central
Region failed to meet this guideline, but. that is only
because the percentages were not rounded off to the nearest
whole number. Close examination of this region indicates
sufficient authorizations to allow career progression are
present.
3. The West and South Central Regions present a prcblem in
the grades cf E6 and E7. Due to career progression and the
shortages cf authorizations in these grades, soldiers may
have to be assigned cutside of the region.
4. The primary reasons for the high percentage of E5
through IS authorizations in the Northeast Region are the
presence cf the Military Personnel Center (MILPERCEN) and
the Pentagon. Due tc an administration training center at
Fort Jackson, SC, the Southeast Region has a high percentage
of E6 and E7 personnel. Despite these skewed authoriza-
tions, career progression should be attainable within the
regions.






BEGIOH 11 E4 E5 J6 J! E8 li TOTAL
KEST 2 98 802 Q11 227 115 70 17 1940
SOOTH CENTRAL 317 840 376 156 106 84 21 1900
SOUTHEAST 4 94 1121 591 522 353 100 26 3207




_lil _76 -12 1827
CONUS TOTAL 17 47 4155 2719 1757 1286 530 129 12,323







E4 E5 s£ II E8 E9 I21Ml
19.3 15.1 12.9 8.9 13.2 13.2 15.7
20.2 1 3.8 8.9 8.2 15.8 16.3 15. 4
27.0 2 1.7 29.7 27.4 18.9 20.2 26.0
19.7 34.8 30.7 40.5 37.7 35.7 28.0
13.8 14.5 17.8 14.9 14.3 14.7 14.8








E4 15 E6 E7 li E9
41.3 21.2 11.7 5.9 3.6 0.9
44.2 19.8 8.2 5.6 4.4 1 .1
35.0 1 8.4 16.3 1 1.0 3. 1 0.8
23.7 27.4 15.7 15.1 5.8 1.3
31.4 21.6 17.1 10.5 4.2 1.0




STATE 23 E4 £5 £6 12 E8 £9 TOTAL
ARIZONA 52 86 79 34 20 14 3 288
CALIFCBNIA 106 250 159 82 57 34 5 693
COLORADO 77 185 67 34 15 9 2 389
IDAHO 1 1 2
MONTANA 1 1 2
CREGCN 2 1 1 4
DTAH 16 14 2 1 2 35
WASHINGTON
-63 265 _88 .25
_!2 10 _7 _527
TOTAL 2 98 802 411 227 115 70 17 194
SOOTH CENTRAL REGICN AUTHORIZ ATIONS
STATE E3 E4 25 26 22 28 29 TOTAL
ARKANSAS 1 4 2 2 9
LOUISIANA 33 115 44 11 15 6 1 225
NEW MEXICO 5 18 22 15 4 9 1 74
CKLAHCMA 68 123 60 19 6 4 2 282
TEXAS 111 583 2U6 109 79 65 11 llio
TOTAL 317 640 376 156 106 84 21 1900
SOUTHEAST REGION AUTHORIZATIONS
STATE J3 E4 25 26 22 28 29 TOTAL
ALABAMA 48 85 69 46 27 7 1 283
FLORIDA 2 18 62 17 10 8 117
GEORGIA 155 300 167 92 64 an 15 637
MISSISSIPPI 2 1 1 1 5
N. CAROLINA 2 08 649 199 200 84 21 9 1370
S. CAROLINA
_81 69 -12 166 167
-11 _1 -595




STATE E3 E4 15 E6 E7 E8 E9 TOTAL
CONNECTICUT 3 1 1 5
DELAWARE 1 1 1 3
MAINE 3 2 5
MARYLAND 59 206 161 86 64 40 9 625
MASSACHUSETTS 32 82 46 34 20 10 1 225
NEW HAMPSHIRE 1 1 2
NEW JERSEY 80 105 120 87 35 29 4 460
NEW YORK 10 24 43 16 19 8 3 123
PENNSYLVANIA 9 26 9 9 7 1 61
VIRGINIA 176 349 484 251 329 81 24 1694
WASHINGTCN,DC 21 42 57 57 40 22 4 243
WEST VIRGINIA 2 1 3
TOTAL 3 78 618 946 540 521 200 46 3449
NORTH CENTRAL REGION AUTHORIZATIONS
STATE 12 E4 II E6 E7 E8 E9 TOTAL
ILLINOIS 13 19 45 28 28 16 2 151
INDIANA 24 26 31 47 53 9 2 192
IOWA 4 2 1 1 8
KANSAS 71 166 56 101 43 19 5 461
KENTUCKY 109 292 105 105 35 17 10 67 3
MICHIGAN 4 16 1 3 1 25
MINNESOTA 7 7
MISSOURI 43 67 90 25 21 6 252
NEBRASKA 3 1 1 5
N. DAKOTA 2 2 4
OHIO 15 1 2 2 20
S. DAKOTA 1 1
TENNESSEE 16 1 3 20
WISCONSIN
^m^m^ _ „ , i 4 ___ j _4 —
_
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1. This battalion consists of MOS 71 D (Legal Clerk) and 71
E
(Court Reporter) personnel.
2. Total CCNUS authorizations range from a low of 13.2
percent in the Northeast tc a high of 24.5 percent in the
Southeast. Based on these percentages, four regions exceed
the 15 percent of CONUS guideline.
3. There is a good distribution of authorizations in all
grades and regions, except for the Northeast. Since MOS 71D
is primarily a unit-level MOS, and since there are few units
in the Northeast, lower rank distribution is skewed.
Because of this, the majority of the personnel in the grade
of E4 would be required to leave the Northeast upon promo-
tion to 15. This may not be too detrimental since it occurs
early in the soldier's career.






REGION 12 E4 J5 E6 E7 E8 E9 TOTAL
WEST 13 28 133 31 20 6 4 235
SOOTH CENTRAL 12 28 152 25 17 5 6 24 5
SOUTHEAST 13 36 152 42 22 5 3 273
NORTHEAST 1 36 48 32 21 6 3 147
NORTH CENTRAL lit 28 JOU
_1£ -27 _4 _2 -115
CONUS TOTAL 53 156 589 166 107 26 18 1 115







E4 E5 E6 12 E8 12 TOTAL
17.9 22.6 18.7 18.7 23. 1 22.2 21. 1
17.9 25.8 15.1 15.9 19.2 33.3 22.0
23.1 25.8 25.3 20.6 19.2 16.7 24.5
23.1 8. 1 19.3 19.6 23. 1 16.7 13.2
17.9 17.7 21.7 25.2 15.4 1 1. 1 19.3
PERCENTAGE OF AUTHORIZATIONS BY GRADE WITHIN EACH REGION
REGION 11 E4 II E6 E7 E8 E9
WEST 5.5 11.9 56.6 13.2 8.5 2.6 1 .7
SOUTH CENTRAL 4.9 11.4 62.0 10.2 6.9 2.0 2.4
SOUTHEAST 4.8 13.2 55.7 15.4 8. 1 1.8 1.1
NORTHEAST 0.7 24.5 32.7 21.3 14.3 4.1 2.0
NORTH CESTRAL 6.5 13.0 48.4 16.7 12.6 1.9 0.9










11 E4 15 E6 12 E8 12 TOTAL
1 3 8 U 2 18
3 13 43 12 8 2 1 82
6 9 U1 10 6 2 1 75
_3 _3
_iU _5 _4 2 2 _60
13 28 133 31 20 6 a 23 5
SOUTH CENTRAL REGION AUTHORIZATIONS
STATE E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8
LOUISIANA
NEW MEXICC
CKLAHCMA 7 20 5 2 1
1EXAS J_ V7 10J 16 _9 3
TOTAL 12 28 152 25 17 5
5 3 30 3 5









STATE 11 E4 25 li 12 18 E9 TOTAL
ALABAMA 1 4 8 4 1 1 19
FLORIDA 2 2
GEORGIA 8 13 65 19 9 2 2 118
N. CABCIINA 4 15 74 13 12 1 1 120
S. CAROLINA
,,
_4 3 _6 x 2 __ ia




STATE U E4 J5 E6 12 E8 E9 TOTAL
MARYLAND 7 8 3 3 1 1 23
MASSACHUSETTS 6 1 2 9
NEW JERSEY 14 10 8 1 1 34
NEW YORK 3 1 1 5
PENNSYLVANIA 1 1 1 3
VIRGINIA 1 12 18 15 12 3 1 62
WASHINGTON, DC
_
_2 _3 _4 _1 j. ^ -11
TOTAL 1 36 48 32 21 6 3 147
NORTH CENTRAL REGION AUTHORIZATIONS
STATE E3 E4 E5 li 12 E8 12 IOTAL
ILLINOIS 1 3 2 2 8
INDIANA 1 1 8 7 1 18
KANSAS 9 10 40 7 10 2 78
KENTUCKY 5 13 52 15 7 1 1 94
MISSOURI 3 7 4 1 1 16
CHIO
__ ,
1 M M i. i „ _ ,_1













































1. This battalion is comprised of 71M (Chapel Activities
Specialist) personnel.
2. Total CONOS authorizations range from 17.8 percent
(North Central) to 23.1 percent (Southeast). Based on these
percentages, all regicns exceed the 15 percent guideline.
3. Overall distribution of authorizations are good;
however, E7 to E9 authorizations are skewed due to the pres-
ence cf tie Chapel School at Fort Monmouth, N.J. Career
progression within a region above the grade of E7 will be
hampered by this.
4. Even ttcugh this area of concern exists, regionalization
should benefit soldiers in the grade E3 through E6.






BEGICN 11 E4 E5 S6 EI E8 E9 TOTAL
WEST 20 101 32 10 6 4 1 174
SOOTH CENTRAL 12 112 38 16 5 2 5 190
SOUTHEAST 29 117 UO 25 5 4 3 223
NORTHEAST 21 83 36 24 27 10 5 206
NORTH CENTRAL
-21 -85 _40 12 _5 _3 _1 T72
CONUS 103 498 186 92 48 23 15 965







E4 I5. E6 E7 E8 E9 TOTAL
20.3 17.2 10.9 12.5 17.4 6.7 18.0
22.5 20.4 17.4 10.4 8.7 33.3 19.7
23.5 21.5 27.2 10.4 17.4 20.0 23.1
16.7 1 9.4 26.1 56.3 43.5 33.3 21.3
17.1 21.5 18.5 10.4 13.0 6.7 17.8








E4 E5 S6 II E8 12
56.0 18.4 5.7 3.4 2.3 0.6
58.9 20.0 8.4 2.6 1. 1 2.6
52.5 17.9 1 1.2 2.2 1.8 1.3
40.3 17.5 11.7 13. 1 4.9 2.4
49.4 23.3 9.9 2.9 1.7 0.6











E3 E4 E5 S6 II II E9 TOTAL
2 5 5 1 1 14





3 2 1 U6
58
_4
-12 _9 -1 1 2 ^ 58
20 101 32 10 6 4 1 174
SOUTH CENTRAL REGION AUTHORIZATIONS




TEXAS Ji _73 23 11 0. 2
TOTAL 12 112 38 16 5 2
1 20 5 1
2 2









STATE 23 Jit J5 E6 E7 E8 E9 TOTAL
ALABAMA a 9 4 3 1 21
GEORGIA 10 53 17 10 2 2 2 96
N. CAROLINA 11 45 14 10 2 1 1 84
S. CARCLI NA j* ,10 _5 _2
_ 1 _ -22




STATE Jl E4 J5 J6 12 E8 E9 I2IAL
MARYLAND 4 16 7 1 1 1 1 31
MASSACHUSETTS 3 6 1 5 2 1 13
NEW JERSEY 5 23 7 11 18 8 1 73
NEW YORK 1 3 3 1 8
PENNSYLVANIA 3 3 6
VIRGINIA 7 26 13 8 5 2 61
WASHINGTON, DC
_1 _6 £ _2 _J _J J _J4
IOTAL 21 83 36 24 27 10 5 206
NORTH CENTRAL REGION AUTHORIZATIONS
STATE 12 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9 !°!Ali
ILLINOIS 1 1 2
INDIANA 1 1 1 1 4
KANSAS 2 33 12 4 3 1 55
KENTUCKY 12 37 19 8 1 1 1 79
MICHIGAN 2 1 3
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1. This battalion is comprised of MOSs 71Q (Journalist) and
71R (Eroadcast Journalist) .
2. Total CONUS authorizations range from 12.9 percent in
the Scuth Central to 29.3 percent in the Northeast. Eased
en thes percentages, four regions exceed 15 percent of the
CONUS total.
3. The battalion fails tc meet the standard of 500 total
CONUS authorizations, having only 488. Three of the five
regions hav€ less than 100 authorizations. Additionally,
this battalion has nc career progression above E7. If the
Signal Corps, which controls MOS 84Z, selects any method
different from the AGC for implementing the NMS, then
regionalization would be meaningless for personnel in this
battalion.
4. There is a poor distribution of all grades. At every
grade, at least one region fails to meet the guideline of 15
percent of the CONUS authorizations.






REGION 11 E4 Jl E6 12 18 E9 TOTAL
WEST 7 42 14 7 10 80
SOOTH CENTRAL 11 22 14 8 8 63
SOUTHEAST 18 46 16 6 18 104
NORTHEAST 16 45 40 19 22 142
NORTH CENTRAL
_7 27 12 28 25 -22
CONOS TOTAL 59 182 96 68 83 488







E4 15 E6 12 18 E9 TOTAL
23.1 1 4.6 10.3 12.0 16.4
12.1 14.6 11.8 9.6 12.9
25.3 16.7 8.8 21.7 21.3
24.7 4 1.7 27.9 26.5 29.1
14.8 1 2.5 41.2 30.1 20.3
PERCENTAGE OF AUTHORIZ ATI CNS BY GRADE WITHIN EACH REGION








52.5 17.5 8.8 12.5
34.9 22.2 12.7 12.7
44.2 1 5.4 5.3 17.3
31.7 28.2 13.4 15.5
27.3 12. 1 28.3 25.3




STATE 11 E4 E5 E6 27 M E9 TOTAL
ARIZONA 1 5 4 5 15
CALIFCBNIA 1 19 5 5 3 23
COLORADO U 10 1 1 1 17
UTAH 2 1 1 4
WASHINGTON 1 _6 _3 mm _1 u
TOTAL 7 42 14 7 10 80
SOOTH CENIRAL REGION AUTHORIZATIONS






LOUISIANA 1 3 2 1
NEW MEXICO 1





TOTAL 11 22 14 8 8
SOUTHEAST REGION AUTHORIZATIONS
STATE 23 EU 25 26 J7 28 E9 TOTAL
ALABAflA 2 4 6
PLORIEA 1 1
GEORGIA 5 15 7 2 8 37
N. CAROLINA 10 24 7 3 6 50
S. CAROLINA
_1 _3 _2 1 _3 10




STATE J3 E4 J5 E6 E7 E8 E9 10 IAL
CONNECTICUT 1 1
MARYLAND 3 4 5 4 3 19
MASSACHUSETTS 2 5 2 9
NEW JERSEY 3 7 1 1 12
NEW YCRK 1 5 4 2 1 13
PENNSYLVANIA 1 1
VIRGINIA 6 20 22 9 12 69
WASHINGTON, DC
_x _3 _8 _2 JL 18
TOTAL 16 45 40 19 22 142
NORTH CENTBAL REGION AUTHORIZATIONS
STATE Jl E4 25 S6 12 M E9 TOTAL
ILLINOIS 1 3 3 2 9
INDIANA 3 17 17 37
KANSAS 2 6 3 4 15
KENTUCKY 4 12 3 2 2 23
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DATA PROCESSING EQUIPMENT OPERATIONS BATTALION
1. This battalion consists of personnel in MOSs 74D
(Computer/Machine Operator) , 74 F (Programmer/Analyst), and
74Z (Data Processing NCO) .
2. Total CONUS authorizations range from 11.1 percent
(South Central) to 46.1 percent (Northeast). Three of the
regions fail to meet the guidelines of 15 percent of the
CONDS authorizations.
3. Because of the disproportionate number of authorizations
in the Northeast, there are serious problems. In this
fcattalicn, more than 40 percent of E4 through E9 authoriza-
tions are in this region, the bulk of them involved with
computers in Virginia. Because of the high cost cf living
associated with this area, it is envisioned that junior
enlisted personnel wculd not seek repetitive reassignrcents
to this region. The authors perceive this would result in a
constant stream of requests seeking transfer out of the
Northeast Region. Ihis constant turmoil would fail to
produce the atmosphere conducive to the development of the
desired strong bends cf esprit and cohesion.




Data Processing Equipment Operations Battalion
CCNUS AUTHORIZATIONS
BEGION 12 M. 11 26 12 E8 11 TOTAL
WEST H4 50 73 51 33 7 4 262
SOOTH CENTRAL 35 37 71 46 31 12 5 237
SOUTHEAST 46 72 101 69 49 14 5 356
NORTHEAST 53 131 267 239 194 42 12 938
NORTH CEKTEAL ,27 33 _62
-22 _59 11 _2 . 29 9
CONUS TOTAL 2 05 323 57 u 552 366 94 28 2142
PEECENTAGE OF CONUS AUTHORIZATIONS PER REGION
J2GION E3 E4 S5 E6 E7 E8 E9 TOTAL
WEST 21.5 15.5 12.7 9.2 9.0 7.4 14.3 12.2
SOUTH CEKTRAL 17.1 11.5 12.4 8.3 8.5 12.8 17.9 11.1
SOUTHEAST 22.4 22.3 17.6 12.5 13.4 14.9 17.9 16.6
NORTHEAST 25.9 40.6 46.5 52.4 53.0 44.7 42.9 46.1
NORTH CENTRAL 13.2 10.2 10.8 17.6 16.1 20.2 7.1 14.0
PERCENTAGE OF AUTHCRIZ ATI CNS BY GRADE WITHIN EACH REGION











19.1 27.9 19.5 12.6 2.7 1.5
15.6 30.0 19.4 13. 1 5. 1 2.1
20.2 28.4 19.4 13.8 3.9 1 .4
13.3 27.0 29.3 19.6 4.2 1.2
11.0 20.7 32.4 19.7 6.4 0.7




STATE 11 E4 J5 E6 E7 E8 E9 TOTAL
ARIZONA 8 18 23 20 8 1 4 82
CALIFORNIA 12 12 30 15 10 3 82
COLORADO 3 2 6 7 4 1 23
UTAH 1 1
KASHINGTCN 21 J8 11 _9 11 2 ^ _74
TOTAL 44 50 73 51 33 7 4 262
SOUTH CENTRAL REGION AUTHORIZATIONS












32 30 47 36 28 10








STATE 11 E4 25 E6 EJ M E9 TOTAL
ALABAMA 5 11 14 5 1 36
FLORICA 15 13 9 1 1 39
GEORGIA 23 36 45 35 25 9 2 175
N. CAROLINA 17 24 26 15 12 4 2 100
S. CAROLINA
_1
_1 2 Jl _2 mmm^ —m 6




STATE 13 E4 M li 12 E8 12 TOTAL
MARYLAND 5 19 37 27 12 2 1 103
MASSACHUSETTS 1 5 7 5 2 1 21
NEW JERSEY 3 U 12 18 16 3 56
NEW YCRK 3 8 9 17 8 3 48
PENNSYLVANIA 5 4 5 6 5 1 26
VIRGINIA 35 83 181 201 137 28 11 676
WASHINGTON, DC _i 8 16 15 14 4 58
TOTAL 53 131 267 289 194 42 12 988
NORTH CENTRAL REGION AUTHORIZATIONS
STATE M E4 25 £6 12 M E9 TOTAL
ILLINOIS 3 22 26 19 3 1 74
INDIANA 1 8 12 39 22 7 1 96
IOWA 1 1
KANSAS 9 8 14 9 4 2 46
KENTDCKI 11 13 10 14 12 2 62
MINNESOTA 1 1
MISSCORI
i, _! _4 _9 _2 _3 — 19
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1. This battalion consists of soldiers with MCSs 75B
(Personnel Administration Specialist), 7 5C (Personnel
Management Specialist), 75D (Personnel Records Specialist),
752 (Personnel Actions Specialist)
,
75F (Personnel
Information Systems Management Specialist), and 75Z
(Personnel Senior Sergeant) .
2. Total CONDS authorizations range from a low of 17.0
percent in the West to a high of 23.2 percent in the
Southeast. This is an even distribution, as all regions
exceed 15 percent of the CONDS authorizations.
3. Distribution by grade is also very even. There are no
problem areas until the grade of 29 , where the bulk of the
authorizations for this grade are at the Pentagon and
Military Personnel Center. Soldiers should be able to
remain in their region through the grade of 28.






BEGION 23 E4 E5 26 12 28 29 TOTAL
WEST 3 20 379 426 197 223 40 24 1609
SOUTH CENTBAL 435 477 500 229 241 51 24 1 957
SOUTHEAST 4 18 530 595 250 311 71 29 2204
NORTHEAST 279 424 520 280 432 81 72 2088
NORTH CENTRAL 291 332 393 239 287
_65 _25 1^32
CONUS TOTAL 17U3 21U2 2434 1195 14 94 308 174 9490







E4 25 26 II 28 29 TOTAL
17.7 17.5 16.5 14.9 13.0 13.8 17.0
22.3 20.5 19.2 16.1 16.6 13.8 20.6
24.7 24. 4 20.9 20.8 23.1 16.7 23.2
1S.8 2 1.4 23.4 28.9 26.3 41.4 22.0
15.5 16.1 20.0 19.2 21.1 14.4 17.2
PERCENTAGE OF AUTHORIZATIONS BY GRADE WITHIN EACH REGION







23.6 26.5 12.2 13.9 2.5 1 .5
24.4 25.5 11.7 12.3 2.6 1.2
24.0 27.0 11.3 14.1 3.2 1.3
20.3 24.9 13.4 20.7 3.9 3.4
20.3 24. 1 14.6 17.6 4.0 1.5




STATE 11 E4 E5 E6 12 E8 E9 TOTAL
ARIZONA 27 42 51 15 15 8 4 162
CALIFOBNIA 127 154 172 76 78 16 10 633
COLORADO 102 98 105 63 63 10 6 44 7
OREGON 1 2 3
UTAH 2 7 2 6 17
WASHINGTON
-M _83 -22 ,41 -59 _6 _4 347
TOTAL 3 20 379 426 197 223 40 24 1609
SOUTH CENTRAL REGION AUTHORIZATIONS
STATE E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9 TOTAL
ARKANSAS 1111 4
LOUISIANA 71 67 72 35 42 5 4 296
NEW MEXICC 7 9 12 6 4 1 1 40
OKLAHOMA 86 81 79 35 40 8 2 331
TEXAS 27J 3±9 336 J52 J 54 37 17 J. 28 6
TOTAL 435 477 500 229 24 1 51 24 1957
SOUTHEAST REGION AUTHORIZATIONS
STATE E3 EU E5 E6 E7 E8 E9 TOTAL
ALABAMA 29 46 52 31 36 4 4 202
FLORIEA 4 7 6 3 2 22
GEORGIA 160 193 244 96 124 38 13 868
MISSISSIEEI 1 3 4
N. CAROLINA 169 215 221 73 98 17 8 801
S. CARCIINA _60
_JJ _7J[ _44 _47 10 _4 _307




STATE J3 E4 M li II E8 E9 TOTAL
CONNECTICOT 1 1 2
MARYLAND 41 75 110 50 49 15 5 345
MASSACHUSETTS 36 43 53 23 26 6 1 188
NEW HAMPSHIRE 1 1
NEW JERSEY 69 99 75 45 50 6 5 34 9
NEW YCRK 8 8 24 12 9 4 65
PENNSYLVANIA 8 11 6 11 1 37
VIRGINIA 102 148 199 122 266 38 56 931
WASHINGTON, DC 23 43 47 22 18 11 5 169
WEST VIRGINIA 1 1
TOTAL 279 424 520 280 432 81 72 2C88
NORTH CENTEAL REGION AUTHORIZATIONS
STATE |3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9 TOTAL
ILLINOIS 9 18 56 31 27 9 2 152
INDIANA 18 28 20 49 52 15 11 193
IOWA 1 4 5
KANSAS 83 81 80 45 49 11 3 352
KENTUCKY 138 160 148 84 92 15 7 644
MICHIGAN 5 4 1 3 1 14
MINNESOTA 1 1 1 2 5
MISSOURI 43 38 70 28 49 12 2 242
NEBRASKA 1 1 1
CHIO 1 7 1 6 15
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1. This battalion is comprised of all soldiers in CHF 97
(Bandsmen) .
2. Total CCNUS authorizations range from 8.6 percent (West)
to 49.8 percent (Northeast) . Three regions have less than
15 percent of the CONCS authorizations.
3. The Northeast is crossly disproportionate because virtu-
ally all MCS 02Ss (Special Bandsperson) are authorized in
this regicn. If the 02 S authorizations are excluded, then
there is a fairly gocd distribution among the regions.
U. Since the authors have recommended that bands are use
unit replacement and hcmeba sing, it would not be sensible to
also use regional basing. Therefore, it is recommended that





REGION li E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9 TOTAL
WEST 4 46 48 49 13 5 165
SOUTH CEKTRAL 7 68 69 72 18 6 240
SOUTHEAST 12 76 79 106 33 14 1 321
NORTHEAST 14 70 92 370 218 135 52 951
NORTH CENTRAL j6 71 67 64 17 6 231
CONUS TCTAL 43 331 355 66 1 299 166 53 190 8







E4 J5 E6 E7 E8 E9 TOTAL
13.9 13.5 7.4 4.3 3.0 8.6
20.5 1 9.4 10.9 6.0 3.6 12.6
23.0 22.3 16.0 11.0 8.4 1.9 16.8
21.1 25.9 56.0 72.9 8 1.3 98. 1 49.8
21.5 18.9 9.7 5.7 3.6 12.1
PERCENTAGE OF AUTHCRIZ ATI CNS BY GRADE WITHIN EACH REGION
REGION E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9
WEST 2.4 2"/. 9 29.1 29.7 7.9 3.0
SOUTH CEKTRAL 2.9 28.3 28.8 30.0 7.5 2.5
SOUTHEAST 3.7 23.7 24.6 33.0 10.3 4.4 0.3
NORTHEAST 1.5 7.4 9.7 38.9 22.9 14.2 5.5
NORTH CENTRAL 2.6 30.7 29.0 27.7 7.4 2.6




STATE E3 E4 E5 26 E7 E8 E9 TOTAL
ARIZONA 2 12 11 11 3 1 40
CALIFCBNIA 2 20 18 20 6 2 68
COLORADO 9 8 9 2 1 29
WASHINGTON
_5 11 _9 _2 1 _28
TOTAL 4 46 48 49 13 5 165






3 ii 15 26 12 1§ E9 TOTAL
11 12 13 3 1 40
3 11 11 11 3 1 40
4 46 46 48 12 4 J60
7 68 69 72 18 6 240
SOUTHEAST REGION AUTHORIZATIONS
STATE 11 E4 E5 E6 12 E8 E9 TOTAL
ALABAMA 5 25 20 22 6 2 80
GEORGIA 4 30 42 65 21 10 1 173
N. CfiBCIINA 8 7 9 3 1 28
S. CAROLINA
_3 13 10. 10 3 _2 —» -M




STATE 11 E4 J5 E6 E7 E8 E9 TOTAL
MARYLAND 2 12 11 53 45 36 16 175
MASSACHUSETTS 2 12 11 11 3 1 40
NEW JERSEY 4 24 22 22 6 2 80
NEW YORK 3 11 25 50 28 13 6 136




i . m m , MMMM^ ^B^MM 1 _J __2
TOTAL 14 70 92 370 218 135 52 951
NORTH CENTRAL REGION AUTHORIZATIONS
STATE E3 E4 M li SI I§ 12 TOTAL
ILLINOIS 2 12 11 11 3 1 40
INDIANA 1 13 11 11 3 1 40
KANSAS 5 12 9 2 1 29
KENTUCKY 2 28 22 22 6 2 82
MISSOURI 1, 11 11 11 _3 1 4
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